Optimal Information Management: Organizations versus Markets by Castanheira, Micael & Leppämäki, Mikko
Optimal Information Management:
Organizations versus Markets∗
Micael Castanheira Mikko Leppämäki
ECARES, CEPR and FNRS† FPPE & RUESG, University of Helsinki‡
Department of Economics, University of Helsinki
Discussion Papers, No. 571:2003
ISSN 1459—3696
ISBN 952-10-1221-8
4.8.2003
∗We are grateful to Patrick Bolton, Juan Carrillo, Mathias Dewatripont, Guido Friebel, Fahad Khalil,
and Oz Shy for their suggestions. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants at ECARES,
RUESG, Universidad Carlos III (Madrid), Swedish School of Economics (Helsinki), Université de Perpignan,
and Mannheim Universität; and by the participants of the EEA conference in Lausanne, the EARIE conference
in Dublin and the NASME conference at the UCLA. The usual disclaimer applies.
†ECARES - ULB CP 114, 50 Av. Roosevelt, 1050 Brussels, Belgium. E-mail: mcasta@ulb.ac.be. Micael
Castanheira is “Chercheur Qualifié du FNRS” and gratefully acknowledges their financial support.
‡FPPE, P.O. Box 54 (Snellmaninkatu 14 A c), FIN-00014, University of Helsinki, Finland. E-mail:
mikko.leppamaki@helsinki.fi RUESG is funded jointly by The Academy of Finland, the University of
Helsinki, Nokia Group, Bank of Finland and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged.
Abstract
This paper examines the optimal structure of delegation when a decision-maker must have
some mass of information processed to make a decision. She can either delegate to agents
working in her own organization, in which case she retains full authority, or she hands over
this authority to an outside supplier, and outsources these tasks. By incorporating authority
in a stylized model of information processing, we endogenize the comparative advantage of
each form of delegation, and provide novel microfoundations for the make-or-buy decision.
We outline precise conditions under which giving up authority is optimal. We also show
which tasks must be outsourced to align the preferences of the outside supplier on their own
preferences, and thereby maximize the benefits accruing from outsourcing.
Keywords: information processing, boundaries of the firm, authority, delegation.
JEL Classification: D21, D73 and L22.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines how a decision-maker optimally acquires and processes information be-
fore making a decision. When the amount of information becomes too large, she will find it
profitable to delegate an increasing number of tasks to agents in her organization, or even
contract them out. This gives rise to a nexus of hierarchical “processing units,” where units
lower in the hierarchy process information for their superiors, who eventually channel it to the
principal. The information processing literature analyzes this type of problems, and helps us
understand why tasks are delegated, why hierarchical structures eﬃciently centralize author-
ity while decentralizing processing, among other issues.1 However, a traditional limitation of
such approach is that “the optimal hierarchies derived could apply just as well to the organi-
zation of production in the U.S.A. as to the organization of production in Microsoft” (Hart
and Moore, 1999).2,3 A second limitation is that the hierarchical position of a unit does not
relate to any concept of authority: some agent A is “hierarchically above” another agent B
when B provides information to A, not because A has authority over B.
To address these limitations, we propose a model of information processing in which we
incorporate a concept of authority in the spirit of Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Hart and
Moore (1999). In our setup, the amount of authority the principal has over agents depends
on her decision whether to retain activities in-house or to outsource them to independent
organizations. In the former case the principal has, by definition, full authority over the
agents: she controls both their hierarchical position and their task. In the latter case instead
she hands over authority to an independent decision-maker (the outside supplier). To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one bringing in the issues of the boundaries of
the firm into the information processing literature.4
Using this approach allows us to go beyond the internal structure of each organization and
1See, e.g. Radner (1992, 1993), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Garicano (2000) or Van Zandt (1997, 1998,
1999).
2Note that this limitation is also stressed by the original authors. For instance: “[...O]ur model [...] could
concern subsets of firms, as well as some interfirm relations” (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, p810), or “[...T]he
boundaries of firms are determined, in part, by the relative eﬃciency of markets and bureaucracies for processing
information. However, [the authors] did not make a direct comparison with how markets perform similar tasks.”
(Van Zandt 1997, p4)
3Holmström and Roberts (1998) detail that “by leveraging its control over software standards, using an
extensive networks of contracts and agreements [...], Microsoft has gained enormous influence in the computer
industry and beyond” (p85), which shows that such hierarchies go beyond a single organization. Moreover,
thanks to this delegation process, the stock market value of Microsoft was at the time as high as $10 million
per employee, which, they argue, cannot be attributed to asset ownership.
4For instance, Hart and Moore (1999) choose to ignore the informational approach and focus on the authority
provided by asset ownership. They however point out that “in future work, it would be desirable to combine
the informational approach in the literature and the authority approach in this [their] paper”.
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provide novel microfoundations for the relative advantage of in-house processing versus out-
sourcing. Quite clearly, this is closely connected to the vast literature on vertical contracting
and holdup problems (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975 and 1985, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart
and Moore 1990, and many others) that addresses the issues of transaction costs, ownership,
relationship-specific investments, and incomplete contracts. In the main analysis, however,
our model will abstract from these issues, to isolate the eﬀects of the loss of authority on
the outsourcing decision and show how it aﬀects the boundaries of the firm as well as the
equilibrium structure of market.
We show that the principal generally benefits from relinquishing authority, and thus from
outsourcing. Yet, outsourcing all activities is never optimal. The reason is that, if too many
tasks were outsourced, there would be a conflict of interests among the principals whose
preferences are not perfectly aligned. Put diﬀerently, principals would then suﬀer from losing
authority. By contrast, if only some tasks are outsourced —namely those for which each of the
principals have aligned interests— principals will induce the outside supplier to become more
eﬃcient than what they could achieve in-house.
To gain further understanding of these results, it is useful to provide details of the model.
A commonly accepted benefit of task delegation is to free up time for the principal and reduce
the total delay of information processing. Our benchmark model —inspired by Radner (1993)
and Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)— rationalizes delegation with the same argument. It only
departs from their approach in two respects. First, since we want to incorporate incentive
issues into the model, we let the performance of an agent depend on the amount of eﬀort
he exerts: the more eﬀort, the better information is processed (i.e. the smaller, the more
summarized is the information transmitted to the superior). In this way, we endogenize the
productivity of each agent, given the incentives of the agents and of the principal. Second,
to focus on the issues we choose to emphasize, we simplify the model of the hierarchy: we
abstract from the possibility of skip-level reporting (see, e.g. Radner, 1993), and adopt a
simplified version of communication costs. Moreover, we assume identical agents (unlike
Prat, 1997) and information elements (Garicano, 2000), abstract from agents making errors
(Sah and Stiglitz, 1986), from environmental uncertainty (Meagher et al. 2001), and other
considerations we do not mention here for the sake of brevity.
As a benchmark, we first consider the case in which the principal retains all tasks in-
house. We find that in-house processing generates minimal delays when agents are willing
to work for free. If meeting their participation constraint requires they are paid a strictly
positive wage, the principal adjusts the structure of her organization to trade oﬀ the benefit
of reduced delay against the cost of a higher wage bill. The next question we address is how
outsourcing may deliver more eﬃcient outcomes. If the principal is alone on the market,
replacing the organization by an outside supplier is shown to be a dominated action: at best,
the outside supplier reproduces the organization of the principal. Yet, industries are seldom
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composed of one firm. Several principals (possibly with diﬀerent needs) coexist on the market.
If the market is suﬃciently large, that is if there are suﬃciently many principals who consider
outsourcing tasks, the incentives of the outside supplier become substantially diﬀerent.
If diﬀerent principals choose to outsource tasks to a same supplier, the latter becomes
their common agent (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). The question is then whether this loss
of authority is costly or beneficial. We first show that, if the preferences of all principals are
perfectly congruent, that is if they want exactly the same information set processed, their
common supplier always sets up an organization that reduces delay below the level obtained
under in-house processing. In other words, there is room for eﬃciency-improving outsourcing.
In addition, outsourcing generates scale economies at the industry-wide level. Hence, losing
authority is generally beneficial in the perfect congruence case.
Yet, assuming perfect congruence lacks realism. Introducing heterogeneity among the
principals shows that outsourcing may become less eﬃcient than in-house processing, even if
market size is large: losing authority becomes prohibitively costly. Under in-house processing
at least, each principal dictates her agents to exert a suﬃcient amount of eﬀort on tasks
that are of direct interest to her. Under outsourcing instead, the supplier focuses less on the
idiosyncratic needs of a given principal when the number of outsourcing principals increases.5
For this reason, principals may prefer to retain all tasks in house.
The value of outsourcing thus appears to be increasing in the level of congruence between
the principals. As we further show, however, even principals with diﬀering objectives can
make their preferences appear perfectly congruent in the eyes of the common supplier, and
thereby reduce the costs of losing authority. This simply requires that only common business
activities —activities for which all principals have common needs— be outsourced. Instead,
remaining tasks (which become the “core business” of the principals’ organizations) must
always be maintained in house, so that the principal retains entire control on them. The
eventual outcome is thus that the “hierarchy” is actually a set of diﬀerent organizations,
which themselves are a collection of an endogenous number of agents. Comparative statics
on exogenous outsourcing costs and on market size then allow us to make predictions about
the evolution of organization size and of total employment in an industry when external
conditions vary, as well as on when principals switch from in-house processing to outsourcing
or conversely.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out our model of
information processing in organizations, and Section 3 shows how organizations should be
structured, given the processing technology and the other parameters of the model. In Section
4, we turn to outsourcing and show that, under certain conditions, principals prefer dealing
5This parallels the analysis of Hart and Holmström (2002), where the scope of the firm aﬀects the preferences
and the behavior of “bosses”.
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with independent suppliers even though this means giving up a part of their authority. In
Section 5, we discuss issues that are more closely related to the contracting literature, and
incorporate the possibility of hold up or ex post bargaining. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Our benchmark model considers a decision-maker (or “principal” — we use the two terms
interchangeably), who has to process an exogenous amount of information in order to reach
a decision. She is free to establish an organization to speed up this process. In that case, she
hires agents who will pre-process information. In this section, we derive the objective function
of such an organization when the amount of eﬀort exerted by these agents is endogenous. The
basic trade-oﬀ that arises is one in which processing delays can only be reduced at the expense
of a higher wage bill. In the next section, we analyze how this trade-oﬀ is solved, before
showing in Section 4 that outsourcing can help circumventing the tension between delay and
wages.
2.1 The Setup
Information processing. To make a decision, our principal must have some exogenous
amount of information processed. Information items are atomless and the initial set of in-
formation has mass M . Agents can reduce the size of this set by pre-processing information,
following a technology we describe below. Then, like in Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), if
the information set reaching the principal has a mass M0 (≤M), she must spend e0M0 units
of time at processing this set before making her decision. In the literature, e0 is commonly
called the overload of the principal.
The information set can be freely subdivided into subsets with positive mass mi among
the diﬀerent agents, who are indexed by i. Individual agents can exert a variable amount of
eﬀort at screening each piece of information. Assuming that the amount of eﬀort per unit of
time is constant, the more time (total eﬀort) they spend on these items, the smaller the size
of their output, and thus the simpler the task of their superior. To interpret this, think for
instance of the news: the mass of information to be processed is the set of events taking place
in the world. An organization (TV channel or newspaper) produces summary information.
The task of each agent/journalist is to gather the information to be broadcasted, and the
more time spent by a subordinate journalist at preparing the set of articles, the easier the
work of the presenter or editor.
One diﬀerence between our setup and that of Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) or Radner
(1993) is thus that the agents’ productivity will be endogenized. Technically, we assume
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that an agent i who processes some mass of information can reduce this mass to a fraction
f (ei) ≤ 1 of its initial mass by exerting a variable amount of eﬀort ei. Eﬀort is productive,
in the sense that f (0) = 1 and f 0 (ei) ≤ 0.6 On another hand, eﬀort is costly: the amount of
time needed to process a set of information (“gather news”) with mass mi while exerting an
eﬀort ei is equal to eimi units of time. There are decreasing returns to eﬀort (f 00 (ei) > 0),
and we also assume that limei→∞ f (ei) > 0.
Costs. For the sake of tractability, the marginal opportunity cost of an agent’s time is set
equal to some exogenous value w(≥ 0). Thus, the principal must pay a wage at least as large
as w eimi to satisfy the participation constraint of an agent who works eimi units of time.
Similarly, we assume that the marginal cost associated with delay is an exogenous constant
r (> 0).
Organizations. The principal is free to hire as many agents as she wants in her orga-
nization. The organization is made of information processing agents who are positioned in
layers, denoted by l = 1, 2, ..., L, which work sequentially.7 This means that information is
first processed by the lowest layer L. Once agents in layer L completed their task, their output
is sent to layer L−1, and then to layer L−2, and so on, until layer 1 transmits the remaining
amount of information to the principal (layer 0).8 Figure 1 below illustrates such a hierarchy.
Figure 1: The general shape of a hierarchy
Principal
6
a1,1.....a1,n1Layer 1:
6
a2,1.....a2,n2Layer 2:
aL,1.....aL,nLLayer L:
6
MInitial information batch:
Importantly, we assume that the principal has full authority over the agents inside the
organization. More precisely, we define an organization as an entity in which the principal
6Note that this functional form implicitly assumes that productivity is independent of the number of times
information has been processed before, like in Radner (1993).
7That is, we abstract from skip-level reporting (see Radner (1993) or Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) for a
comparison).
8 In Castanheira and Leppämäki (2003), we analyze a simpler version of the model, and show that the
essence of the results remains identical with a just-in-time version of the model.
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can directly contract on the amount of eﬀort exerted by each agent.9 The agent’s only choice
will then be to accept or reject the contract oﬀered by the principal (see below).
A priori, increasing the number of agents in a layer can only speed up processing, thanks to
an increased division of labor. For instance, consider the simplest organization, with one layer
only. If the initial set of information is equally divided among the agents, and if n1 agents are
hired in layer 1 to exert an eﬀort level e1 (> 0), the delay needed by that layer is: d1 = e1M/n1.
Thus, the larger is n1, the shorter is the delay d1. Yet, we know that big organizations
eventually become more diﬃcult to manage and face higher total (production) costs. One
of the reasons is that increased coordination and communication problems eventually reduce
their performance (Radner 1993, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994). For the sake of tractability,
we introduce these costs in a reduced form, and assume that each agent slows down the
organization by some fixed delay λ.10 To avoid confusion, we call this cost λ “coordination
costs”.
2.2 The objective function
We are now in a position to derive the objective function of the principal. Delegating tasks
to agents may speed up information processing, although at the expense of an increased wage
bill. Her problem is thus one of task assignment; each agent must be requested to work on
some information subset and exert some amount of eﬀort in order to minimize the joint cost
of delay and of wages. For any given organizational structure with N agents, the principal
thus faces an optimization problem with 2N control variables. Lemma 1 however shows that
any agent belonging to a given layer l should be assigned a same task {el,ml}:
Lemma 1 To minimize processing costs, all agents i in a given layer l must process the same
mass of information and exert the same level of eﬀort: ei = el and mi = ml ∀i ∈ l.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
This result implies that all agents in a given layer become “homogenous,” in the sense
that they perform a similar task. It follows that:
Ml =M ·
LY
j=l+1
f (ej) , ∀l < L and dl = el
Ml
nl
+ λnl.
9Note that, if eﬀort was exogenous, the principal would implicitly be also able to contract on the eﬀort
exerted by agents outside the organization. Such an assumption is the one generally made in the literature.
By endogenizing eﬀort, instead, we shall be able to distinguish between the costs and benefits of outsourcing.
10Formally, communication costs à la Radner-Dewatripont-Bolton could be considered, if we were assuming
that the cost of adding one agent in layer l were some function λ (nl, nl−1, nl+1), which they derive from the
fundamentals of their model.
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That is, the mass of information reaching layer l is only determined by the eﬀort levels in each
layer below l and, since tasks are identical in a layer, the delay needed to process information
is inversely proportional to the number of agents in that layer (ml =Ml/nl). This stems from
increased division of labor, or parallel processing. However, the more agents in the layer, the
higher are coordination costs, λnl.
Adding up these delays, the total delay needed by the organization, DOrg, becomes:
DOrg ({el} , {nl} , L) = e0M0 + dOrg, where dOrg =
LX
l=1
dl,
in which {el} denotes the vector of eﬀort levels, {nl} the vector of the number of agents per
layer, and L stands for the total number of layers in the organization.
Finally, since eﬀort is contractible inside the organization, wages must only satisfy the
participation constraint of the agents: wi ≥ eimi. Thus, total wage costs are equal to:
WOrg ({el} , L) = w ·
LX
l=1
nl (elml) = w ·
LX
l=1
elMl,
and the objective function of the principal is:
min
{el},{nl},L
TCOrg ({el} , {nl} , L) = rDOrg ({el} , {nl} , L) +WOrg ({el} , L) . (1)
Solving this optimization problem will allow us to endogenize the cost of decision-making,
as well as the associated structure of the organization. This is the purpose of the next section.
3 In-house processing
In this section, we derive the optimal structure of the organization as well as the optimal
eﬀort levels under in-house processing. In this setup, the principal has full authority over the
agents, and controls all choice variables. We show that, despite full authority, ineﬃciencies
arise —both in terms of increased delay and wage costs— when wages are positive. By contrast,
Section 4 will analyze when and how outsourcing can overcome such ineﬃciencies.
Most of the analysis in the literature focuses on delay minimization, which will prove to
be a useful benchmark in our analysis as well. Given the control variables at hand, delay
minimization imposes:
∂DOrg
∂el
= 0;
∂DOrg
∂nl
= 0. (2)
From (1), however, it is straightforward to see that total cost minimization imposes instead:
r
∂DOrg
∂el
= −∂WOrg
∂el
;
∂DOrg
∂nl
= 0. (3)
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That is, the only case in which cost minimization coincides with delay minimization is when
wages are zero. Substituting for DOrg and WOrg into (3), and solving for optimal eﬀort
levels, layers size, and hierarchical structure, we can state our first proposition, which lays
foundations for later analysis:
Proposition 1 Under in-house processing, optimal eﬀort levels are determined recursively:
f 0 (e∗1) = −
1/n1 +w/r
e0
, (4)
f 0 (e∗l ) = −
1/nl +w/r
1/nl−1 +w/r
Ã
e∗l−1 −
f
¡
e∗l−1
¢
f 0
¡
e∗l−1
¢!−1 , ∀l ≥ 2, (5)
and each eﬀort e∗l is increasing in e0 and in layer size, nl. In turn, optimal layer size, n
∗
l ,
as well as the optimal number of layers L∗, are strictly increasing in M and e0. Finally, the
equilibrium delay needed by the organization is monotonically increasing in w/r.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Thus, rather unsurprizingly, total delay is minimized either when w = 0 or r → ∞. For
w/r strictly positive, cost minimization calls for a diﬀerent structure of the organization.
Higher wages not only increase the total costs of decision-making but also total delay: to
limit the impact of increased wage costs, the principal adapts the organization, delegates less,
and hence processes a larger fraction of the initial information set by herself.11 Conversely,
given the wage level, a higher r induces the principal to select an organizational structure
that generates shorter delays.
Even though we are treating r as exogenous in our analysis, it is easy to relate it to some
economic fundamentals and examine how changes in those aﬀect the level of this marginal
cost of delay. Assume for instance that processing any information set M generates a return
equal to R, which is itself a function of aggregate demand, market size, and the like. The
quicker one such set is processed, the earlier the organization can start processing another
set, thereby increasing total profits over some period of time. Hence, the higher is aggregate
demand or the more “global” is the market, the closer to delay minimization is the objective
function of the principal. Yet, the next section will show that higher aggregate demand is not
necessary for an outside supplier to value delay minimization higher.
Proposition 1 also shows that, when decision-making becomes more time-consuming (e0 or
M increases), the principal increases the size of her organization along two dimensions. Both
the size of each layer and the number of layers are increased. This shows that time-consuming
11 In Castanheira and Leppämäki (2003), we show that, in the case of exogenous eﬀort levels, only the optimal
number of layers is aﬀected by wages.
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tasks call for increased “task specialization” (the number of diﬀerent layers/tasks increases).
Prat (1997) showed that, if diﬀerent types of agents coexist, each diﬀerent layer should be
staﬀed with agents of a diﬀerent type. In contrast with his approach, we consider agents that
are ex ante completely homogenous. Yet, depending on their hierarchical position, the agents’
task becomes diﬀerent ex post.
4 Outsourcing information acquisition
As shown in the previous section, the best the principal can do is to adapt the structure of
her organization to the current economic environment. She can generally not maintain speed
and profitability at the same time. Can she resolve this tension by contracting tasks outside
the organization? At first glance, since ineﬃciencies cannot be avoided under full authority,
outsourcing should only make matters even worse. In our setup, losing authority should be
akin to an increase in “transaction costs,” in the terminology of Coase and Williamson.
Yet, as Abraham and Taylor (1996), Domberger (1998) or Hummels et al. (1998) illus-
trate, outsourcing is a widespread phenomenon. In the US, for instance, “the market for
outsourced services was estimated to be $100 billion in 1996”, and “outsourcing is particu-
larly widespread in the IT and business services area” (Domberger 1998, p21). Outsourcing
typically involves more than production: the whole decision-making process (R&D, choice of
production methods) tends to be contracted out. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to observe
that competing companies (say, Nokia and Ericsson) outsource some activities to a common
supplier (here: Elcoteq, a Finnish producer of communication equipment).12 Other examples
abound. Think for instance about the car industry, where electrical component producers
(like Bosch) supply competing car producers; or about international news agencies that sell
the same pre-processed information to various local newspapers and other forms of media.
These observations raise several questions. First, incentive problems should become more
severe under outsourcing, since outsourcing necessarily increases the number of intermediaries:
unless the mass of information is trivially small, the outside supplier will also have to hire
agents within his own organization. Hence, the principal will be dealing with these agents
only indirectly, through the authority of the outside supplier. A first question to address
is thus why principals prefer to trap themselves into such arm’s length relationships, even
though they could hire agents directly. Second, diﬀerent principals are shown to outsource
to common suppliers. That is, they choose to link themselves to a common agent. Hence, a
second question to address is why common agency is eﬃcient.
12Elcoteq’s advertisement (www.elcoteq.com) states that it “provides engineering and manufacturing ser-
vices, supply chain management and after-sales services to international high-tech companies,” which highlights
its stress on making decisions (“engineering services”) for its customers.
9
To address these questions, we extend the model of Section 3 and allow the principal
to contract out processing tasks to an outside supplier, in which case the supplier dictates
the hierarchical position and eﬀort level of the agents in his organization. Outsourcing thus
creates an incentive problem, in the sense that the supplier maximizes his own profits, and
not that of the principal. As we show below, the magnitude of this incentive problem will
depend on how diﬀerent the principals’ preferences are.
The contract between the principal and the outside supplier specifies the delivery of an
information set of mass MS within a given delay dS , against the payment of some price p.
That is, contracting is made on the output of the supplier, not on the task of the agents.
Hiring an outside supplier entails some non-negative fixed costs C (see Domberger 1998, p60-
67), which we assume are borne by the principal and expressed in delay units. Clearly, trade
between a principal and a supplier can only happen when it generates a surplus. We assume
that this surplus goes to the supplier.13 In the spirit of Bernheim and Whinston (1986),
this makes the supplier (common agent) residual claimant in equilibrium, which gives him
high-powered incentives — see below.
The industry is composed of several principals, who are indexed by j = 1, 2, ...,Ω, where
Ω represents the number of principals in the industry or the size of the market. Each principal
j is characterized by the information set Mj she needs to have processed. For symmetry, all
information sets Mj are assumed to have a same mass M . Yet, these sets may only partially
overlap: α ∈ [0, 1] is a congruence parameter, that represents the fraction of items that
is common to all principals in the industry. The remaining fraction (1− α) is specific to
one principal only.14 Accordingly, we call the former fraction “industry-wide” or “common”
information, and the latter “specific” information. Importantly, note that this notion of
specificity does not relate to any exogenous comparative advantage at processing diﬀerent
parts of the information set, since any organization has access to the same technology.
4.1 Full Outsourcing
We first consider the case in which principals are constrained to outsource either all or none
of their activities to a common supplier.15 Moreover, to facilitate comparisons with the in-
house processing case analyzed earlier, it is assumed here that the principals do not hire any
agent “in-house” if they opt for full outsourcing. The total processing costs faced by a given
13Results immediately extend to the case in which ex post bargaining implies that some of the surplus goes
to the principal — see section 5.
14A more general case is presented in section 5.
15Clearly, to make matters interesting, we assume that M and e0 are suﬃciently large, so that (for w = 0)
the optimal level of delegation is strictly positive under in-house processing.
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principal j thus become:
TCFull (j) = r
¡
dSFull (j) +M
S
Full (j) e0
¢
+ rC + p (j) ,
where dSFull and M
S
Full are respectively the delay needed by the supplier, and the mass of his
output. The functional shape of these is introduced below, and will be seen to depend on
the degree of congruence among principals. Next, C is the cost of hiring an outside supplier,
and p (j) is the price paid for the service supplied. After the supplier completed his task, the
principal still has to process the remaining items, which entails an additional delayMSFull (j) e0.
Clearly, the principal has an incentive to fully outsource her activities if and only if
TCFull (j) ≤ TCOrg (j) , that is if outsourcing reduces processing costs. Using the results
of Section 3, this condition amounts to:
p (j) ≤ rDOrg +WOrg − r
¡
dSFull (j) +M
S
Full (j) e0
¢
− rC,
and the supplier clearly selects the price that makes this condition binding.
The equilibrium values of dSFull and M
S
Full depend on the outside supplier’s behaviour.
Following the same methodology as in the previous section, we derive his objective function
and, from there, his equilibrium behaviour. His profits are:
πSupplier =
X
j
p (j)−WSFull
=
X
j
£
K (j)− r
¡
dSFull (j) +M
S
Full (j) e0
¢¤
−WSFull, (6)
with K (j) = rDOrg (j) +WOrg (j) − rC, and WSFull being the total wage cost entailed by
the supplier under full outsourcing. The latter has high-powered incentives since he reaps all
the benefits from improving information processing i.e. from reducing processing delays, wage
costs and/or size of the remaining information set (MSFull). For instance, if there were only one
principal (Ω = 1), the supplier would find it optimal to exactly reproduce the organization of
the principal: wage costs and the marginal return to eﬀort are identical. Hence, the optimal
eﬀort levels, number of agents per layer, and total number of layers would be identical, by
Proposition 1. However, the outsourcing cost C implies that contracting out cannot profitable
in that situation.
When more than one principals outsource to the supplier, the latter is alone to process
the union of his customers’ information sets. Therefore, outsourcing may end up increasing
delay, since the latter, as well as the size of the supplier’s organization, are also increasing
in the mass of information processed, for the same reasons as in Proposition 1. We shall say
that outsourcing increases eﬃciency if it reduces processing delay below the one obtained
under in-house processing. On the other hand, outsourcing concentrates wage costs into
a single organization (that of the supplier) instead of duplicating them in each principal’s
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organization. This is an endogenous scale economy eﬀect, already highlighted in the literature
(see e.g. Domberger 1998).
Case 1 below presents a case in which the needs of all principals are exactly aligned (the
congruence parameter α is 1). In that case, outsourcing is shown to both increase eﬃciency
and generate scale economies. Case 2 instead considers a situation in which principals have
diﬀering needs (α < 1). In that case, the benefit of scale economies is still present but, for a
large industry size, losing authority generates costs larger than this benefit.
Case 1: No specific information. There is no specific information when α = 1, that
is when all principals use the same information set. In this case, congruence is perfect. All
information is industry-wide, and there is no conflict of interest between principals; all share
a common goal.
If several principals outsource to a common supplier, the latter becomes their common
agent. From the results of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), we know that the common agent
(supplier) maximizes the joint profit of such an industry. Assuming that all principals out-
source to the same supplier, and using a superscript ‘S’ to denote a variable under the control
of the supplier, his objective becomes (we drop the index j from now on):
max
LS ,{eSl },{nSl }
πSupplier = Ω
£
K − r
¡
dSFull +M
S
Full e0
¢¤
−w
PLS
l=1 e
S
l M
S
l , with:



dSFull =
PLS
l=1
³
eSl
nSl
M
QLS
l0=l f
¡
eSl0
¢
+ λnSl
´
,
MSFull =M
QLS
l=1 f
¡
eSl
¢
.
(7)
Since all principals are perfectly congruent, as one reads from (7), the supplier processes an
information set of mass M , which is why both delay and MSFull are only proportional to M .
It does not depend on the number of principals who outsource to this supplier, which in turn
maximizes the scale economy eﬀect of outsourcing. Under in-house processing, Ω principals
would separately process a set of size M . Under full outsourcing, this set is processed by one
organization only.
The objective function of the supplier (7) directly compares with (1). The only relevant
diﬀerence between the two objective functions is that the marginal cost of time taken into
account by the supplier is Ω times larger than under in-house processing. Applying Lemma 2
(see Appendix 1), this yields:
f 0
³
eS
∗
1
´
= −1/n
S∗
1 +w/ (rΩ)
e0
; (8)
f 0
³
eS
∗
l
´
= − 1/n
S∗
l +w/ (rΩ)
1/nS
∗
l−1 +w/ (rΩ)
Ã
eS
∗
l−1 −
f
¡
eS
∗
l−1
¢
f 0
¡
eS
∗
l−1
¢!−1 ,∀l ≥ 2. (9)
From these conditions, it follows that the common supplier behaves exactly as a principal
who would be facing a marginal cost of delay equal to Ωr instead of r. Given the results of
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Proposition 1, this implies that full outsourcing must reduce processing delays when wages
are strictly positive:
Proposition 2 For α = 1 and w = 0, full outsourcing is always dominated by in-house
processing. For w > 0, Ω > 1, and rC ≤ (1− 1/Ω)WOrg, all principals outsource to a
common supplier, and outsourcing reduces delays.
Proof. If w = 0, a principal creates the organization that minimizes processing delays
(see Proposition 1). Hence, outsourcing can only reduce profits. For w > 0 and Ω > 1, by
(8) and (9) , outsourcing reduces processing delays compared to in-house processing. Hence,
∀rC ≤ WOrg, principals are willing to pay a strictly positive price to the supplier and rC ≤
(1−1/Ω)WOrg ensures that this price is high enough for the supplier to make positive profits.
Proposition 2 shows that full outsourcing may be preferred to in-house processing when
wages are high. When wages are zero, outsourcing cannot bring any additional benefit.16
For positive wages instead, in-house processing may simply be too costly. The rationale for
this result is that high wages have less of a distortionary eﬀect on a common supplier. As we
stressed in the previous section, distortionary eﬀects are inversely proportional to the marginal
cost of delay, and this cost proves to be higher for a common supplier, since any reduction in
delay allows him to increase his price on each principal. It thus appears that market provides
better incentives than authority per se. In this case, losing authority can only be beneficial.
The second benefit of outsourcing is that wage costs are concentrated into one single
organization (that of the supplier). This is the scale economy eﬀect stressed above. Yet, scale
economies only play a secondary role in motivating outsourcing: even if we eliminate these,
e.g. by increasing C up to (1−1/Ω)WOrg/r, outsourcing remains a dominant strategy: in the
absence of specific information, outsourcing always increases eﬃciency.
Conversely, normalizing r to 1 and letting Ω be suﬃciently large, one can check that
there is a threshold w¯(C) such that, for any value of w below this threshold, information is
processed in-house. Within the range [0, w¯(C)], the closer to zero is w, the more eﬃcient is
information processing (see Proposition 1). However, if w increases above the threshold w¯(C),
information processing will be outsourced. In the limit (for Ω→∞), the supplier minimizes
total processing delays, for any finite w. High wage levels hence imply that information is
still processed quickly, although at the expense of higher outsourcing costs (each of the Ω
principals bears a cost C). Thus, for moderate levels of C, larger market size increases the
value of outsourcing.
16Results would of course be diﬀerent at the margin had the principals and the supplier access to diﬀerent
technologies. This latter aspect is often at the heart of the firm’s specificities in a Williamsonian type of
analysis of the boundaries of the firm.
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The predictions of this proposition may sound somewhat counterintuitive, since only two
types of outcomes can arise: either all principals process all information in-house, or all
outsource to one single supplier. Such a prediction is unlikely to be met in actuality. As
the second case shows below, however, this all-or-nothing outcome only results from the
assumption of perfect congruence.
Case 2: Introducing specific information. In the above setting, processing delays
under outsourcing can never exceed those obtained under in-house processing. Profit maxi-
mization induces the supplier to make decisions that maximize eﬃciency, because all principals
share a common goal. Things are quite diﬀerent when the objectives of the diﬀerent principals
are not perfectly aligned: dedicating extra resources to one principal then means that delays
must increase for all other principals. If some principal j had authority over the agents who
work for the supplier, she would require them to focus on her own information set, and discard
the information needed by the others. Under outsourcing, however, principals do not have
this authority. Only the supplier controls the allocation of tasks within his organization.
In this extended case, a supplier with Ω customers must process the union of all the
information sets of the principals, that is an information set with mass:
MTotal = [Ω (1− α) + α] M,
since there are Ω disjoint subsets with mass (1− α)M , and one common, industry-wide,
subset with mass αM. Therefore, the delay needed by the supplier will now be proportional
to MTotal (and hence depend on Ω). By contrast, under in-house processing each principal
dictates her agents to focus exclusively on her information set, and delays remain proportional
to M . On the other hand, outsourcing still generates scale economies at the industry-wide
level, since MTotal < ΩM, and wages are concentrated in one organization. A priori, full
outsourcing could still be profitable for both parts. Yet, we find that lack of congruence
between the principals magnifies incentive problems; it makes it costly to lose authority.
Denoting again by MSFull ≡ M
QLS
l=1 f
¡
eSl
¢
the mass of information reaching each principal
under full outsourcing, the objective function of the common supplier indeed becomes:
min
LS ,{eSl },{nSl }
Ωr


LSX
l=1

MTotal × eSl
µ
1
nSl
+
w
Ωr
¶ LSY
l0=l+1
f
¡
eSl0
¢
+ λnSl

+MSFull e0

 (10)
with the only diﬀerence between (10) and (7) above being that the delay is proportional to
MTotal, whereas each principal only cares about her own information set, MSFull. Rewriting
(10) by factoring in MTotal and substituting for MSFull yields:
ΩrMTotal


LSX
l=1

eSl
µ
1
nSl
+
w
Ωr
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l0=l+1
f
¡
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¢
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
+ M
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e0
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l0=1
f
¡
eSl0
¢ .
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Applying again the results of Lemma 2, the first order conditions for the supplier follow
immediately:
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; (11)
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that is, like in Case 1, the supplier behaves “as if” the marginal cost of delay were Ω times
larger than its actual value, which should make process information more intensely. However,
he also behaves “as if” the overload of each principal were a fraction 1/ [Ω(1− α) + α] of its
actual value, e0. Altogether, (11) and (12) imply that eﬀort levels are strictly increasing in the
level of congruence, α. The rationale for this result is as follows. The profits of the common
supplier increase when he can, at a relatively low wage cost, reduce processing delays for all
principals in his portfolio of clients. However, when his clients do not have perfectly congruent
interests, processing information for one given principal implies that delay is increasing for all
other principals, which reduces his profits. Thus, the larger the clientele, the less important
it is to pay attention to the specific needs of each single customer. In other words, the more
clients the supplier has, the costlier it is to lose authority. Hence:
Proposition 3 For α < 1 and Ω → ∞, there is no equilibrium in which all principals fully
outsource their activities to a common supplier, even for arbitrarily low outsourcing costs
(C → 0). In addition:
i) For w/r and α suﬃciently small, in-house processing dominates full outsourcing, ∀Ω.
ii) For intermediate values of w/r, C → 0, and α suﬃciently close to 1, full outsourcing
dominates in-house processing. However, several suppliers (with a finite number of customers)
must coexist on the market if Ω is large.
iii) For large values of w/r and α < 1, each principal prefers to process all information by
herself rather than fully outsourcing or hiring agents in-house.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Reading from (11), it is immediate to see why all principals never outsource to a common
supplier if Ω is too large: Ω→∞ implies that eﬀort levels are equal to zero, and hence that
the supplier does not process information at all. Thus, bearing the outsourcing cost C is a
dominated action. Put diﬀerently, the number of customers served by a single supplier must
remain suﬃciently small, such that the costs borne by the loss of authority remain below the
benefits of scale economies; diﬀerent suppliers may co-exist on the market.
Proposition 2 already showed that full outsourcing is a dominated action for w → 0.
Since outsourcing is even less profitable when preferences are not fully congruent, part i of
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Proposition 3 follows easily. Conversely, part ii simply states that, if outsourcing costs are
suﬃciently low, and if the preferences of the principals are suﬃciently congruent, intermediate
wages ensure that full outsourcing is still eﬃciency enhancing. Finally, since the number of
customers served by a given supplier is bounded above, high wages also reduce the eﬃciency
of the supplier, and hence the value of delegation altogether. Importantly, the comparison
between Propositions 2 and 3 for Ω→∞ demonstrates that this latter result only arises when
losing authority over the agents is costly. The next question we address is thus how principals
can reduce these costs.
4.2 Partial Outsourcing
The above results show that, except for perfectly aligned preferences (that is, if α = 1), full
outsourcing can be quite costly. It might thus be in their interest not to outsource all of their
activities, but only the industry-wide, common, activities. In this case, principals retain “in-
house” the fraction (1−α) of the information which is specific to them. The processing of this
information thus becomes, in a sense, the “core business” of their organization, whereas they
outsource the remaining fraction α, for which preferences are perfectly aligned throughout
the industry. We call this case partial outsourcing.
Under partial outsourcing, both the principals and the supplier will hire agents, but process
a diﬀerent part of the information set. Hence, agents in diﬀerent organizations will work in
parallel, and we cannot determine in advance which organization will finish its task first. To
maintain coherence with the assumptions of Section 2, we keep assuming that the principal
can start processing information only when all agents have finished processing their respective
batch. Hence, the delay needed to process all information becomes:
DPartial = max
£
dPPartial, d
S
Partial
¤
+ e0
£
MPPartial +M
S
Partial
¤
, (13)
where a superscript P denotes a variable under the control of the principal and a superscript
S a variable under the control of the supplier. MPPartial and M
S
Partial are the respective output
of the two organizations.
In words, the total delay under partial outsourcing, DPartial, is the maximum between 1)
the delay needed by the principal’s organization when it only processes a part of the whole
batch (dPartial) and 2) the delay needed by the supplier (dSupplier) plus the delay needed by
the principal to process the information transmitted to her by the two organizations together
—the last term in (13).
Hence, under partial outsourcing, each principal bears a cost equal to:
TCPartial = rDPartial +W
P
Partial + rC + p, (14)
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in which WPPartial denotes the wages paid by the principal in the case of partial outsourcing.
Like under full outsourcing, we compute the price that binds the incentive condition of the
principal:
pPartial = K˜ −
¡
r max
£
dPPartial, d
S
Partial
¤
+ e0M
S
Partial
¢
,
in which K˜ = r
£
dOrg + e0
¡
MOrg − MPPartial
¢¤
+
¡
WOrg −WPPartial
¢
− rC, where a subscript
‘Org’ denotes the equilibrium value of a variable under in-house processing, as before. Given
pPartial, the profits of the supplier are:
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The diﬀerence between (15) and (10) is thus essentially that the delay needed to process infor-
mation under partial outsourcing is now only proportional to αM, instead of [Ω (1− α) + α]M
above. Importantly, partial outsourcing achieves more than a reduction in the mass of infor-
mation to be processed by the supplier. By maintaining “core business” activities in house,
principals only outsource the fraction of the information set for which their preferences are
perfectly aligned. In this way, they manage to recover from the loss of authority they were
experiencing under full outsourcing:
Proposition 4 For any w ≥ 0, α ∈ (0, 1), there exists a non-empty set (0, CmaxPartial ] such
that if C belongs in this set, there exists an equilibrium in which all principals outsource to a
common supplier. Moreover, CmaxPartial is monotonically increasing in Ω and M .
Proof. See Appendix 4.
The results of Proposition 4 contrast with those of Propositions 2 and 3: whereas full
outsourcing is only profitable when wages and congruence are suﬃciently large, partial out-
sourcing proves profitable even if congruence and wages are small. The reason for this result
is that diﬀerent organizations can now work in parallel. This increases specialization at the
industry level, and reduces processing delays. Moreover, the amount of information processed
by the supplier is independent of the size of the market, Ω. Put diﬀerently, partial outsourc-
ing allows the creation of smaller and more eﬃcient organizations, but maintains high scale
economy benefits. Last, since principals only outsource the fraction of the information set
for which their preferences are perfectly congruent,17 the outside supplier provides further
eﬃciency improvements, by Proposition 2.
17For that reason, partial outsourcing and in-house processing become formally equivalent if α→ 0, whereas
full and partial outsourcing become formally equivalent for α→ 1.
17
It is useful to stress that the benefits of specialization are purely endogenous here. Be the
agent working on a “specialized” or a “general” information set, his productivity is identical.
It should thus be clear that the results of Proposition 4 would yet be reinforced if the agents’
productivity was increasing in their level of specialization (see Bolton and Dewatripont 1994
or Garicano 2000).
Full and Partial outsourcing compared. Exploiting the results of Propositions 3
and 4, we can now compare the relative value of partial and full outsourcing. Importantly,
suppliers and principals may have conflicting interests with respect to the type of outsourcing
chosen. For instance, partial outsourcing may generate lower profits for the supplier, because
it increases the profits of the principals. In a world of free entry, however, the equilibrium
outcome would be the one that maximizes the joint profit of the industry. For that reason,
we use total industry surplus to determine which type of outsourcing method dominates:
Proposition 5 For any value of w, α ∈ (0, 1), Ω ≥ 1, M and e0, partial outsourcing is always
strictly preferred to full outsourcing.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
This result may seem surprising at first glance. Indeed, full outsourcing could be thought
as more profitable when congruence is high: instead of creating Ω principal-controlled and one
supplier-controlled organizations, full outsourcing allows for one, bigger, firm and hence for
more delegation to the agents. However, one must remark that, when congruence is perfect
(α = 1), full and partial outsourcing are formally equivalent, since all information processing
is outsourced in both cases.18 For α smaller but close to 1, the structure of the supplier-
controlled organization is basically the same under full or partial outsourcing. However, the
latter option still has the benefit of containing the costs of loss of control, whereas it only has
a second-order eﬀect on the mass of information processed by the principals.
Put diﬀerently, this proposition demonstrates that securing authority on the management
of specific information is valuable. For this reason, the principals’ organizations have an
endogenous comparative advantage at processing this part of the information set. Conversely,
the outside supplier has a comparative advantage at processing common information items,
because he is less sensitive to wage costs. Thus, in equilibrium, principals should always
maintain in-house the treatment of specific information.
Thus, if outsourcing costs are small, the only market equilibrium that survives is one
in which each principal focuses on her “core business”. She creates an organization that
specializes in the treatment of this specific information, and outsources “common-business
18Moreover, for C = 0, and w > 0, total costs are necessarily higher under in-house processing than under
either type of outsourcing.
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activities” to an outside supplier. Conversely, if outsourcing costs are large, the only equi-
librium that survives is the in-house processing one. Note that the rationale for maintaining
”core-business activities” in-house is somewhat diﬀerent from the arguments developed, for
instance, by Domberger (1998). One of his arguments lies in the risk of losing intellectual
property rights. However, we show that maintaining ”core business” in-house is beneficial even
when such risks are absent. Conversely, an oft-used argument in favor of outsourcing is that it
increases flexibility. Such a benefit is absent from our setup, since we assume “environmental
certainty”. Yet, partial outsourcing remains a profitable option. Finally, Domberger also men-
tions that external suppliers have greater incentives to improve their processing technology
and reduce their costs, because of competitive pressures. Our results justify this presumption:
the incentives provided by the market induces the common supplier to provide more eﬃcient
services (the structure of its organization can be interpreted as a proxy for technology here),
in addition to generating scale economies.
5 Extensions and discussion
5.1 Few types of principals
Proposition 5 shows that ”core business” activities are always retained in-house. What hap-
pens if heterogeneity among the principals is less strong? To address this question, assume
that lack of congruence only exists between diﬀerent “types” of principals, and that the num-
ber of these types is small compared to the size of the market. That is, there are many
identical principals of each type, and fewer diﬀerent types. To solve for the equilibrium mar-
ket structure, we can proceed in two steps. Denoting by k the number of types in the industry,
consider first the k markets in isolation. Since principals have perfectly aligned preferences in
each market, by Proposition 2, they fully outsource their activities under the same conditions
as before. Second, consider the entire market, now composed of k entities with imperfectly
aligned preferences. By Proposition 5, those may also want to outsource industry-wide activi-
ties to another, distinct, supplier. Hence, when market size is large but the number of diﬀerent
types limited, the equilibrium structure of the market might be characterized by increasing
waves of specialization, and more complex relationships between diﬀerent organizations. This
illustrates the sentence by Adam Smith: “The division of labor is limited by the extent of the
market” (1880, p18, cited by Domberger 1998, p80).
5.2 Hold-ups and the choice of a supplier
In this and next subsection we shortly discuss how one can introduce the possibility of hold
up or ex post bargaining that have been extensively studied in the incomplete contract lit-
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erature. Recall that, in Section 4, we assumed the principal could only outsource tasks to
an independent supplier. A natural question that arises is why one of the other principals
could not replace this supplier. This should reduce total outsourcing costs by C, and hence be
profitable. Quite interestingly, however, this decision might open the way for increased risks
of being held up, since the other principal may, in some cases, want to foreclose competitors
by not delivering information (like, e.g. in Bolton and Whinston 1993).
To understand why this may happen, one must consider the case in which principals are
actual competitors on the final market, in which case moral hazard problems may arise. To
illustrate this in more detail, assume for a moment that there are exactly two principals,
whose preferences are perfectly congruent. Moreover, the value of processed information is
equal to V if one principal has access to the information, and equal to V −∆ if both principals
have access to it (because of increased competition).19 Now, assume that principal 1 acts as
a supplier to principal 2. In this case, her profits would be given by:
π1Supply = V −∆− r
£
dSFull +M
S
Full e0
¤
−WSFull +
¡
WOrg + rDOrg − rC − r
£
dSFull +M
S
Fulle0
¤¢
(16)
where the term between parentheses in (16) is the price principal 2 is ready to pay. If the
delivery of information is not contractible, however, she may promise to sell information to
principal 2 in the first place, but deviate and hold up information ex post. This strategy
generates a profit:
π1Holdup = V − rDOrg −WOrg. (17)
Comparing (16) and (17), not delivering processed information is profitable when:
∆ ≥ 2r
£
DOrg − dSFull −MSFull e0
¤
+ 2WOrg −WSFull − rC,
that is, if competition strongly aﬀects the profitability of the principals’ decisions (i.e. if ∆ is
large enough).
By contrast, the risk of hold-up is reduced with an independent supplier. Since the price of
information is contracted in advance, the profits of the supplier are increasing in the number of
actual buyers.20 Summing up, if the benefits of the diﬀerent principals are independent (they
are not competing on the final market), and if C is not too large, the most eﬃcient outcome
is that only one principal creates an organization, and processes information for the entire
market. If instead the profits of the diﬀerent principals are strongly linked to one another,
each principal may reduce moral hazard problems by outsourcing to an independent supplier
who does not value information directly.
19Note that the value of information has been assumed constant (∆ = 0) until now.
20One may argue that principals could make higher price oﬀers, conditional on being the only one to receive
the information. However, such (illegal) contracts are more diﬃcult to enforce. Moreover, one must remember
that if the supplier delivers information to one principal only, his profits are necessarily negative if C > 0 (see
Section 4).
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5.3 Ex-post price renegotiation
Another typical problem analyzed in the literature is the possibility of ex post renegotiation,
which has been shown to generate underinvestment in relationship-specific assets. In Section 4,
we assumed that the supplier has full bargaining power. More generally of course, the supplier
may, ex post, only manage to extract some fraction β of the surplus generated by outsourcing.
Yet, it is easy to check that, when the supplier anticipates ex-post price renegotiation, first
order conditions (8) and (9) become:
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Put diﬀerently, the behaviour of the supplier is determined exactly as in Section 4, albeit
for the fact that ex-post price bargaining reduces the outside supplier’s incentives to reduce
delays. Technically, this amounts to changing the parameter Ω into Ω˜ ≡ βΩ. Thus, our results
directly extend to ex post price bargaining, with the only diﬀerence that market size must be
suﬃciently large, or β suﬃciently close to 1, for outsourcing to arise in equilibrium.
6 Conclusions
We proposed a model of information processing in which the principal must decide whether
to retain activities in-house or to outsource them, knowing that this decision also aﬀects
the amount of authority she has over agents. Central to the analysis was the question of
understanding how hierarchies are shaped, and what determines the comparative advantage
of either form of delegation.
In the absence of outsourcing, our results reproduce some of those in the information pro-
cessing literature: the larger the mass of information or the more overloaded is the principal,
the bigger and the more hierarchized her organization will be. Moreover, this organization
then represents the entire hierarchy of “processing units” who work for the principal. One
additional feature of our model was then to relate the structure of this organizations to ex-
ternal market conditions, and to show that the task performed by each agent depends on his
hierarchical position.
Next, the paper showed that ”common business tasks” are sometimes performed better
by the market than by such an organization. In that case, outsourcing takes place and the
hierarchy of “processing units” encompasses more than the principal’s organization. Indepen-
dent organizations in the upstream market process information for the principal. However,
the organization of the principal remains in operation, focusing on what becomes its ”core
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business activities”. When the principal has a specific interest in processing a particular piece
of information, her incentives to process it quickly are stronger than the outside supplier’s,
and conversely for ”common business” information items. For this reason, under outsourcing
the upstream market is made of independently managed organization(s) that provide ”com-
mon business” services for the whole industry, whereas the downstream market consists of
organizations, run by the principals, that focus on ”specific information”.
The next question we addressed is when outsourcing arises in equilibrium. Our results have
shown that the value of outsourcing increases when the size of the market is large, when the
preferences of the principals become suﬃciently congruent, and when wages increase compared
to the marginal cost of delay. That is, if there are suﬃciently many principals who need similar
information to make their decisions and/or if the urgency of decision-making matters less.21
To express these results diﬀerently, we could say that “globalization” (see also Hummels et al.,
1998) and/or economic slowdowns favor outsourcing: “globalization” increases market size,
and economic downturns reduce profitability, thereby making the principals less impatient.
However, outsourcing has contrasted eﬀects on the upstream and downstream markets. Since
they process a smaller mass of information by themselves, downstream firms (that of the
principals) will tend to become “flatter” and less staﬀed, which could reduce employment.
However, setup costs are then likely to also be reduced, which could trigger additional entry in
the market. Instead, the opposite trend takes place in the upstream market: we also showed
that diﬀerent principals have an incentive to outsource their tasks to a common supplier.
Thus, outsourcing and “globalization” induce concentration in the upstream market. As a
consequence, outside suppliers must hire additional workers and create more hierarchized
organizations. In the absence of entry in the downstream market, this process leads to a
reduction in total employment in the industry, which generates a reduction in total costs and
shortens delays.
This paper extended the analysis of information processing to incorporate strategic orga-
nizational decisions generally disregarded by the information processing literature. However,
our analysis of course ignored several issues that have been recently addressed by the research
on the theory of firm. For instance, the paper abstracted form the lack of congruence between
the agents and the principal (Friebel and Raith 2000, Dessein 2002, Dewatripont and Ti-
role 2003), imperfect synergies (Vayanos 1998), heterogeneity of skills (Prat 1997) or general
equilibrium considerations (Marin and Verdier 2002). Yet, raising the issue of the span of
authority as a representation for the boundaries of the firm allowed us to exploit the insights
of the information processing literature. This provided us with novel microfoundations for
our analysis of the comparative advantages of managing information in organizations versus
markets.
21Using a diﬀerent approach, Grossman and Helpman (2003) and Marin and Verdier (2002) provide very in-
teresting general equilibrium analyses of the interactions between market conditions, corporate, and/or market
structure.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Two preliminary lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We demonstrate this lemma for layer 1, and for the case in which n1 = 2. By recursion, the
proof holds for all layers l ≥ 2 and any nl ≥ 3.
Denote the two agents in the layer by a and b. ea and eb are their eﬀort levels, and ma and mb are
the size of their respective information sets. The cost of processing information is then:
TC = r [2λ+max {eama, ebmb}+ e0 (f (ea)ma + f (eb)mb +max {0, M −ma −mb})]
+w (eama + ebmb) .
Therefore, if ma +mb <M and eama > ebmb, we have:
∂TC
∂ea
= (r [1 + e0f
0 (ea)] +w)ma.
If ∂TC/∂ea > 0, ∀ea, agent a (and, by extension, also agent b) should exert 0 eﬀort. In the comple-
mentary case where ∂TC/∂ea < 0 for ea → 0, this FOC implies:
f 0 (e∗a) = − (1 +w/r) /e0.
Since f (0) = 1 and f (e) is decreasing and convex in e, this also implies that:
f (e∗a) < 1− e∗a
1+w/r
e0
. (20)
Using (20) to compute ∂TC/∂ma shows that the latter derivative is strictly negative, which implies
that ma +mb < M is suboptimal. In other words, it is always optimal to set mb =M −ma.
Next, and still for the case eama > ebmb, we compute the optimal level of eﬀort for agent b:
∂TC
∂eb
= (re0f
0 (eb) +w)mb ⇒ f 0 (e∗b) = −
w/r
e0
,
which implies that e∗b > e
∗
a. Using the properties of the function f (e) , the latter implies that:
f (e∗a)− f (e∗b) > (e∗b − e∗a)
w/r
e0
,
which in turn yields:
∂TC
∂ma
= r [e∗a + e0 (f (e
∗
a)− f (e∗b))] +w (e∗a − e∗b)
> r
h
e∗a + e0 (e
∗
b − e∗a)
w/r
e0
i
+w (e∗a − e∗b) = e∗a > 0,
and hence that ebmb < eama cannot be cost minimizing. Hence, we must also have:
ebmb = eama. (21)
Finally, it remains to show that ma = mb is optimal. We demonstrate this by contraction. Assume
ma > mb, in which case ea is strictly less than eb, by (21). Therefore, total costs can be reduced by
decreasing ma, subject to eama constant.
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Lemma 2 The eﬀort levels that minimize a function of the type:
F
³
{el}, {nl}, L;γ0, δ, λ˜
´
= γ0
YL
j=1
f (ej) +
LX
k=1
·
ek
µ
1
nk
+ δ
¶YL
j=k+1
f (ej) + λ˜nk
¸
are given by:



f 0 (e∗1) = −
1/n1 + δ
γ0
,
f 0 (e∗l ) = −
1/nl + δ
1/nl−1 + δ
µ
e∗l−1 −
f(e∗l−1)
f0(e∗l−1)
¶−1
,∀l ≥ 2
(22)
Proof. Diﬀerentiating F (·) with respect to el to derive the first order condition, we find:
1
nl
+ δ = f
0 (el)
f (el)

γ0
lY
j=1
f (ej) +
l−1X
k=1

ek
µ
1
nk
+ δ
¶ lY
j=k+1
f (ej)



 , or:
f 0 (e∗l ) =
−(1/nl+δ) f(e∗l )
γ0
Q
l
k=1 f(e∗k)+
P l−1
k=1 e
∗
k(1/nk+δ)
Q
l
k=j+1 f(e∗k)
. (23)
Applying (23) to layer 1 yields the first line in (22). To derive the optimal level of eﬀort in the other
layers, we must compare the value of (23) for two adjacent layers. First, we decompose (23) into:
f 0 (e∗l ) =
−(1/nl+δ)
e∗l−1(1/nl−1+δ)+[γ0
Q l−1
k=1 f(e∗k)+
P l−2
k=1 e
∗
k(1/nk+δ)
Q l−1
k=j+1 f(e∗k)]
. (24)
Second, for layer l− 1 (23) yields:
f 0
¡
e∗l−1
¢
=
−(1/nl−1+δ) f(e∗l−1)
γ0
Q l−1
k=1 f(e∗k)+
P l−2
k=1 e
∗
k(1/nk+δ)
Q l−1
k=j+1 f(e∗k)
. (25)
Noting that the term between brackets on the denominator of (24) equals the denominator in (25)
then shows that this optimization problem is recursive, and yields the second line in (22).
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 1
In any given organization, the optimal levels of eﬀort are the ones that minimize (1). That objective
function can however be re-written into:
TCOrg ({el}, {nl}, L) = rM

e0
LY
j=1
f (ej) +
X
l
el
µ
1
nl
+
w
r
¶ LY
k=l+1
f (ek) +
λnl
M


= rM F ({el}, {nl}, L; e0, w/r,λ/M) .
Put diﬀerently, the principal faces the same problem as in Lemma 2, with γ0 = e0, δ = w/r and
λ˜ = λ/M. Applying the results of Lemma 2 then yields (4) and (5) in the main text. Next, ∂e∗l /∂nl > 0
and ∂e∗l / ∂e0 > 0 are then directly proven by computing the derivative of these equations.
Next, the optimal value of nl directly results from the first order condition:
∂D
∂nl
= −e∗l
Ml
(n∗l )
2 + λ = 0⇒ n
∗
l =
q
e∗lMl/λ.
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To show that the optimal number of layers is increasing in M and in e0, consider an organization
which, givenM, λ, f (·) and e0 should be structured into L∗ layers, and in which the principal receives
a batch of mass MOrg. Now, consider the (suboptimal) choice of instructing some additional agents,
in number n¯, to process this batch another round, before she starts processing remaining items. Total
costs increase by:
∆ = λn¯+
h e¯
n¯
+ (f (e¯)− 1) e0 +we¯
i
MOrg ,
with: e¯ s.t. f 0 (e¯) = − (1/n¯+w) /e0.
Since f 00 > 0, this implies that f (e¯) < 1− e¯e0 (1/n¯+w) , and hence that ∂∆/∂MOrg < 0. Therefore, a
suﬃciently large increase in M (which must increase MOrg in the L∗-layer organization) implies that
∆ becomes negative: the optimal number of layers must be increasing in M . Similarly, ∂∆/∂e0 < 0,
and the optimal number of layers is thus also increasing in e0.
Finally, we turn to processing delays. By revealed preferences, we have:
D∗Org (w1) +
w2
r ω
∗
Org (w1) ≥ D∗Org (w2) + w2r ω
∗
Org (w2) and
D∗Org (w1) +
w1
r ω
∗
Org (w1) ≤ D∗Org (w2) + w1r ω
∗
Org (w2) ,
where D∗Org (w) is the optimal level of delay given the wage level w and
¡
w ω∗Org (w)
¢
is the optimal
total wage cost given that wage level. Thus, for w1 < w2, we have ω∗Org (w1) ≥ ω∗Org (w2) , and hence
D∗Org (w2) ≥ D∗Org (w1) . ¥
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3
If the supplier has Ω → ∞ customers, by (11), the optimal level of eﬀort in layer 1 is 0. Thus layer
1 must be suppressed. Hence, the optimal level of eﬀort in layer 2 is defined by (11). Thus, layer 2
must also be suppressed. By recursion, it is optimal for the supplier to set L = 0, which implies that
MSFull = M . However, the principal can obtain the same mass of information at lower cost by simply
not outsourcing. This shows that, for any C ≥ 0, there is no equilibrium in which a same supplier has
Ω→∞ customers.
To prove point i, remember that w→ 0 implies that the principal sets up an organization that is “fully
eﬃcient.” Yet, under full outsourcing, a decrease in α decreases eﬀort levels (and increases processing
delays), whereas it has no eﬀect under in-house processing. By continuity, full outsourcing must be
strictly dominated by in-house processing for low wages and congruence α.
Conversely, for α suﬃciently close to 1 and some given — and finite — value of Ω, the cost borne by the
loss of authority is small. Thus, processing costs are more sensitive to an increase in w under in-house
processing compared to full outsourcing. By continuity, for C small enough, there must exist values of
w such that full outsourcing strictly dominates in-house processing for high enough values of α, which
proves point ii.
For w arbitrarily large, by (11), the outside supplier also selects eﬀort levels that are arbitrarily close
to zero, in which case the delay reduction achieved through outsourcing is too small to compensate for
any outsourcing cost C > 0, which proves point iii. ¥
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6.1 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4
Consider first the case of in-house processing, in which Ω independent organizations process informa-
tion. Total costs of the industry are then:
ΩTCOrg = Ωr


M
L∗X
l=1
e∗l
QL∗
j=l+1 f(e
∗
j )
n∗l| {z }
Z1
+ M e0
L∗Y
j=1
f
¡
e∗j
¢
| {z }
Z2
+ λ
L∗X
l=1
n∗l| {z }
Z3
+
w
r
M
L∗X
l=1
e∗l
L∗Y
j=l+1
f
¡
e∗j
¢
| {z }
Z4


.
Now, consider the following suboptimal case of partial outsourcing: each principal outsources the
common part α of the information set M . However, assume that, in this process, she maintains the
structure of her organization unchanged. Next, assume that the common supplier also creates an
organization with the same structure. Total sectorial costs then become:
Ωr


C + max {α, 1− α}M
L∗X
l=1
e∗l
QL∗
j=l+1 f(e
∗
j)
n∗l| {z }
ZPa rt ia l1
+ M e0
L∗Y
j=1
f
¡
e∗j
¢
| {z }
ZPa r t ia l2
+ λ
L∗X
l=1
n∗l| {z }
ZPa rt ia l3
+
+
w
r
(1− α)M
L∗X
l=1
e∗l
L∗Y
j=l+1
f
¡
e∗j
¢
| {z }
ZPa rt ia l4


+wαM
L∗X
l=1
e∗l
L∗Y
j=l+1
f
¡
e∗j
¢
| {z }
ZPa r t ia l5
.
Hence:
1. By outsourcing the common fraction α of their information set, principals manage to reduce
processing delay to a fraction of its initial level, i.e. ZPartial1 = max {α, 1− α}Z1 < Z1.
2. Since organizational structure is unchanged, the total size of the batch reaching the principal
must also remain unchanged: Z2 = ZPartial2
3. Since all organizations have the same structure as under in-house processing, hiring costs are
the same for the supplier and for the principals: ZPartial3 = Z3.
4. Finally, outsourcing allows each principal to reduce wage costs in her organization to a fraction
(1− α) of its initial level. Conversely, only one common supplier has to bear the remaining
fraction α of that initial wage cost. Thus, total sectorial wage costs are reduced to ΩZPartial4 +
ZPartial5 < ΩZ4. Total wage cost is thus reduced by (Ω− 1)αZ4.
This shows that, for α ∈ (0, 1), there must exist a range (0, Cmax] such that, for any C in that
interval, partial outsourcing dominates in-house processing.
Clearly, for α = 0, partial outsourcing and in-house processing are formally equivalent, and thus
yield identical profits. ¥
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Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 5
We follow the same procedure as for the proof of Proposition 4: consider the optimal supplier’s
organization under full outsourcing. Total sectorial costs in that case are given by:
Ωr


C + [Ω (1− α) + α] M
LS
∗X
l=1
eS
∗
l
QLS∗
j=l+1 f
³
eS
∗
j
´
nS
∗
l| {z }
Z¯1
+ e0M
LS
∗Y
j=1
f
³
eS
∗
j
´
| {z }
Z¯2
+ λ
LS
∗X
l=1
nS
∗
l| {z }
Z¯3


+ ...
...+ [Ω (1− α) + α] M w
LS
∗X
l=1
eS
∗
l
LS
∗Y
j=l+1
f
³
eS
∗
j
´
| {z }
Z¯4
.
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4, suboptimal partial outsourcing reduces
Z¯1 while Z¯2, Z¯3 and Z¯4 are unchanged. Hence, partial outsourcing must necessarily increase total
sectorial profits, and full outsourcing is dominated. Clearly, for α = 1, full and partial outsourcing are
formally equivalent, and yield identical profits. ¥
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